We study revenue optimization learning algorithms for repeated second-price auctions with reserve where a seller interacts with multiple strategic bidders each of which holds a fixed private valuation for a good and seeks to maximize his expected future cumulative discounted surplus. We propose a novel algorithm that has strategic regret upper bound of O(log log T ) for worst-case valuations. This pricing is based on our novel transformation that upgrades an algorithm designed for the setup with a single buyer to the multi-buyer case. We provide theoretical guarantees on the ability of a transformed algorithm to learn the valuation of a strategic buyer, which has uncertainty about the future due to the presence of rivals.
Introduction
Revenue maximization is one of fundamental development directions in major Internet companies that have their own online advertising platforms [35, 12, 1, 27, 41] . Most part of ad inventory is sold via widely applicable second price auctions [38, 57] and their generalizations like GSP [72, 73, 74, 69] . Adjustment of reserve prices plays a central role in revenue optimization here: their proper setting is studied both by game-theoretical methods [61, 4] and by machine learning approaches [62, 19, 57, 64] .
In our work, we focus on a scenario where the seller repeatedly interacts through a second-price auction with M strategic bidders (referred to as buyers as well). Each buyer participates in each round of this game, holds a fixed private valuation for a good (e.g., an ad space), and seeks to maximize his expected future discounted surplus given his beliefs about the behaviors of other bidders. The seller applies a deterministic online learning algorithm, which is announced to the buyers in advance and, in each round, selects individual reserve prices based on the previous bids of the buyers. The seller's goal is to maximize her revenue over a finite horizon T through regret minimization for worst-case valuations of the bidders [59, 29] . Thus, the seller seeks for a no-regret pricing algorithm.
To the best of our knowledge, no existing study investigated worst-case regret optimizing algorithms that set reserve prices in repeated second-price auctions with strategic bidders whose valuation is private, but fixed over all rounds. However, our setting constitutes a natural generalization of the wellstudied 1-buyer setup of repeated posted-price auctions 1 (RPPA) [6, 59] to the scenario of multiple buyers in a second-price auction. In the RPPA setting, there are optimal algorithms [27, 28, 29] that have tight strategic regret bound of Θ(log log T ). This bound follows from an ability of the seller to upper bound the buyer valuation even if he lies when rejecting a price [27, Prop.2] . This ability strongly exploits that the buyer knows in advance the outcomes of a current and all future rounds since he has complete information due to the absence of rivals. In our multi-bidder scenario, this does not hold: a bidder has incomplete information and is thus uncertain about the future. Hence, the theoretical guarantees could not be directly ported to our scenario when trying straightforwardly apply the optimal 1-buyer RPPA algorithms.
In our study, we propose a novel algorithm that can be applied against our strategic buyers with regret upper bound of O(log log T ) (Th. 1) and constitutes the main contribution of our work. We also introduce a novel transformation of a RPPA algorithm that maps it to a multi-buyer pricing and is based on a simple but crucial idea of cyclic elimination of all bidders except one in each round (Sec.3). Construction and analysis of the proposed algorithm and transformation have required introduction of novel techniques, which are contributed by our work as well. They include (a) the method to locate the valuation of a strategic buyer in a played round under his uncertainty about the future (Prop. 1); (b) the decomposition of strategic regret into the regret of learning the individual valuations and the deviation regret of learning which bidder has the maximal valuation (Lemma 1); and (c) the approach to learn the highest-valuation bidder with deviation regret of O(1) w.r.t. T (Lemma 3).
2 Preliminaries: setup, background, and overview of results Setup of Repeated Second-Price Auctions. We study the following mechanism of repeated secondprice auctions. Namely, the auctioneer repeatedly proposes goods (e.g., advertisement opportunities) to M bidders (whose set is denoted by M := {1, . . . , M }, M ∈ N) over T rounds: one good per round. From here on the following terminology is used as well: the seller for the auctioneer, a buyer for a bidder, and the time horizon for the number of rounds T . Each bidder m ∈ M holds a fixed private valuation v m ∈ [0, 1] for a good, i.e., the valuation v m is equal for goods offered in all rounds and is unknown to the seller. The vector of valuations of all bidders is denoted by
. In each round t ∈ {1, . . . , T }, for each bidder m ∈ M, the seller sets a personal reserve price p , the standard allocation and payment rules of a second price auction are applied [64] : (a) for each bidder m ∈ M, we check whether he bids over his reserve price or not, a . The summary on all notations is in App. C. Thus, the seller applies a (pricing) algorithm A that sets reserve prices p 1:T := {p t } T t=1 in response to the buyers' bids b 1:T := {b t } T t=1 . We consider the deterministic online learning case when the reserve price p m t for a bidder m ∈ M in a round t ∈ {1, . . . , T } can depend only on bids b 1:t−1 of all bidders during the previous rounds and, possibly, the horizon T . Let A M be the set of such algorithms. Hence, given a pricing algorithm A ∈ A M , the buyers' bids b 1:T uniquely define the corresponding price sequence {p t } T t=1 , which, in turn, determines the seller's total revenue T t=1 a t p t . This revenue is usually compared to the revenue that would have been earned by offering the highest valuation
were known in advance to the seller [6, 27] . This leads to the notion of the regret of the algorithm A:
Following a standard assumption in mechanism design that matches the practice in ad exchanges [59, 29] , the seller's pricing algorithm A is announced to the buyers in advance. A bidder can then act strategically against this algorithm. In contrast to the case of one bidder (M = 1), where the buyer can get an optimal behavior in advance, and the repeated mechanism reduces thus to a two-stage game [6, 59, 27] ; in our setting, a bidder has incomplete information since he may not know the valuations and behaviors of the other bidders. Therefore, in order to model buyer strategic behavior under this uncertainty, we assume that, in each round t, each buyer optimizes his utility on subgame of future rounds given the available history of previous rounds and his beliefs about the other buyers.
Formally, in a round t, given the seller's pricing algorithm A, a strategic buyer m ∈ M observes a history h t from a (possibly mixed) strategy σ ∈ S T 2 that maximizes his future γ m -discounted surplus:
2 A buyer strategy is a map σ : H1:T → R+ that maps any history h ∈ Ht in a round t to a bid σ(h) ∈ R+, where H1:T := T t=1 Ht and Ht := R t−1
+ . Let ST denote the set of all possible strategies.
where γ m ∈ (0, 1] is the discount rate 3 of the bidder m. The expectation in Eq. (1) M and beliefs β over T rounds as
In our setting, following [6, 59, 27, 29] , we seek for algorithms that attain o(T ) strategic regret for the worst-case valuations v ∈ [0, 1] M . Formally, an algorithm A is said to be a no-regret one when
The optimization goal is to find algorithms with the lowest possible strategic regret upper bound O(f (T )), i.e., f (T ) has the slowest growth as T → ∞ or, alternatively, the averaged regret has the best rate of convergence to zero.
Background on pricing algorithms. To the best of our knowledge, there is no work studied worstcase regret optimizing algorithms that set reserve prices in repeated second-price auctions with strategic bidders whose valuation is private, but fixed over all rounds. However, in the case of one bidder, M = 1, the bidder has no rivals, and, thus, the second-price auction in a round t reduces to a posted-price auction, where the buyer decision reduces to a binary action: to accept or to reject a currently offered price p Pricing algorithms in the strategic setup of RPPA with fixed private valuation and worst-case regret optimization were well studied last years [6, 59, 27, 29] . It is known that, if the discount rate γ = 1, any algorithm has a linear strategic regret, i.e., the regret has lower bound Ω(T ) [6] , while, for the other cases γ ∈ (0, 1), the lower bound of Ω(log log T ) holds [46, 59] . The first algorithm with optimal strategic regret bound of Θ(log log T ) was found in [27] . It is Penalized Reject-Revising Fast Exploiting Search (PRRFES), which is horizon-independent and is based on Fast Search [46] modified to act against a strategic buyer. The modifications include penalizations (see Def. 1). A strategic buyer either accepts the price at the first node or rejects this price in subsequent penalization ones [59, 27] . PRRFES is also a right-consistent algorithm: a RPPA algorithm A 1 is right-consistent (A 1 ∈ C R ) if it never offers a price lower than the last accepted one [27] . The algorithm PRRFES was further modified by the transformation pre to obtain the one that never decreases offered prices and has a tight strategic regret bound of Θ(log log T ) as well [29] .
The workflow of a RPPA algorithm A 1 is usually described by a labeled binary tree T(A 1 ) [59, 27, 29] : initialize the tracking node n to the root e(T(A 1 )); in each round, the label p(n) is offered as a price; if it is accepted (rejected), move the tracking node to the right child n := r(n) (the left child n := l(n), resp.); and go to the next round. The left (right) subtrees rooted at the node l(n) (r(n), resp.) are denoted by L(n) (R(n), resp.). When trees T 1 and T 2 have the same node labeling, we write
Overview of our results. We cannot directly apply the optimal RPPA algorithms [27, 29] , because our bidders have incomplete information in the game, while the proofs of optimality of these algorithms strongly rely on complete information. This completely different information structure of the multi-buyer game results in very complicated bidder behavior even in the absence of reserve prices [14] . Hence, it is challenging to find, in the multi-buyer case, a pricing algorithm that has 3 Note that only buyer utilities are discounted over time, what is motivated by real-world markets as online advertising where sellers are far more willing to wait for revenue than buyers are willing to wait for goods [59, 29] . 4 So, σ and β m determine the future outcomes a m s and p m s , that are thus random variables. 5 In our setup, we do not require that the strategies actually used by the buyers M −m match with the buyer m's beliefs β m (an equilibrium requirement), because our results hold without this requirement.
regret upper bound of the same asymptotic behavior as the best one in the 1-buyer RPPA setting. Our research goal comprises closing of this research question on the existence of such algorithms.
First, we propose a novel technique to transform a RPPA algorithm to our setup that is based on cyclic elimination of all bidders except one by means of high enough prices (Sec. 3). Separate playing with each buyer removes his uncertainty about the outcome of a current round; and, despite remaining uncertainty about future rounds, this is enough to construct a tool to locate his valuation (Prop. 1). Second, we transform PRRFES in this way and show that its regret is affected by two learning processes: the one learns bidder valuations and the other learns which bidders have the maximal valuation (Sec. 4). The former learning is controlled by the design of the source PRRFES, while the latter one is achieved by a special stopping rule that excludes bidders from suspected ones. A proper combination of parameters for the source pricing and the stopping rule provides an algorithm with strategic regret in O(log log T ), see Th. 1.
Related work. Several studies maximized revenue of auctions in an offline/batch learning fashion: either via estimating or fitting of distributions of buyer valuations/bids to set reserve prices [38, 69, 64] , or via direct learning of reserve prices [57, 58, 67, 54] . In contrast to them, we set prices in repeated auctions by an online deterministic learning approach. Revenue optimization for repeated auctions was mainly concentrated on algorithmic reserve prices, that are updated in online way over time, and was also known as dynamic pricing [33, 25] . Dynamic pricing was considered: under game-theoretic view [50, 22, 11, 8, 56] ; from the bidder side [44, 75, 39, 13] ; in experimental studies [52, 16, 76] ; as bandit problems [5, 51, 18] ; and from other aspects [66, 31, 21, 41] . Repeated auctions with a contextual information about the good in a round were considered in [7, 24, 53, 49] . The studies [68, 36, 26, 43, 71 ] elaborated on setups of repeated posted-price auctions with a strategic buyer holding a fixed valuation, but maximized expected revenue for a given prior distribution of valuations, while we optimize regret w.r.t. worst-case valuations without knowing their distribution.
There are studies on reserve price optimization in repeated second-price auctions, but they considered scenarios different to ours. Non-strategic bidders are considered in [19] . Kanoria et al. [45] studied strategic buyers (similarly to our work), but maximized expected revenue w.r.t. a prior distribution of valuations. Our setup can be considered as a special case of repeated Vickrey auctions in [40] , but their regret upper bound is O(T α ) in T and holds only when selling several goods in a round. However, the most relevant works to ours are [6, 59, 27, 29] , where our strategic setup with fixed private valuation is considered, but for the case of one bidder, M = 1. The most important results of these works are discussed above in this section (see "Background on pricing algorithms").
Dividing algorithms and div-transformation
Barrage pricing. In our setting, a pricing algorithm is able to set personal (individual) reserve prices to each bidder and is able hence to "eliminate" particular bidders from particular rounds. Namely, in a round t, an algorithm can set a reserve price p bar s.t. a strategic bidder m, independently of his valuation, will never accept p bar , i.e., will never bid no lower than this price; such a price is referred to as a barrage reserve price. From here on we use p bar = 1/(1 − γ 0 ), γ 0 ∈ (0, 1): accepting it once will result in a negative surplus for a buyer with discount γ i ≤ γ 0 . We use the phrase "the bidder m is eliminated 6 from participation in the round t" to describe this case.
Dividing algorithms. In this subsection, we introduce a subclass of the algorithms A M that is denoted by A div M ⊂ A M and is referred to as the class of dividing algorithms (stands for lat. "Divide et impera"). A dividing algorithm A ∈ A div M works in periods and tracks a feasible set of suspected bidders S aimed to find the bidder (or bidders) with the maximal valuation v. Namely, it starts with all bidders S 1 := M at the first period which lasts M rounds. In each period i ∈ N, the algorithm iterates over the currently suspected bidders S i : in a current round, it picks up m ∈ S i , sets a non-barrage reserve price to the bidder m, sets a barrage reserve price to all other bidders M −m , and goes to the next round within the period by picking up the next buyer from S i . Thus, the algorithm meaningfully interacts with only one bidder in each round through elimination of all other bidders by means of barrage pricing. After the i-th period, the algorithm A identifies somehow which bidders from S i should be left as suspected ones in the next period (i.e., be included in the set S i+1 ).
When the game has been played with the dividing algorithm A, one can split all the rounds into I periods: {1, . . . , T } = ∪
is the individual part of the regret and
is the deviation part of the regret.
Informally, this lemma states that the regret consists of the individual regrets against each buyer m in his rounds I m and the deviation of the buyer valuations v from the maximal one v. So, we see a clear intuition: a good algorithm should (1) learn the valuations v of the buyers (minimizing individual regrets) and (2) learn which buyers have the highest valuation v (minimizing the deviation regret).
M → bool when it is a dividing algorithm from A div M s.t. its subalgorithms A m are A 1 and the stopping rule sr determines which bidders are not suspected ones in S i+1 after a period i. Namely, first, the algorithm div M (A 1 , sr) tracks the state of each buyer m ∈ M in the tree T(A 1 ) of the RPPA algorithm A 1 (see Sec. 2) by means of a personal (individual) feasible node. For each period i and for each round t m i ∈ T i , the current state (i.e., the history of previous actions) of the buyer m is encoded by the tracking node n For a RPPA right-consistent algorithm A 1 ∈ C R with penalization rounds, let A 1 denote the transformation of A 1 s.t. it is equal to A 1 , but each penalization sequence of nodes {n j } r j=1 ⊂ T(A 1 ), r ≥ 2, (see Def. 1) is reinforced in the following way: all the prices in the nodes {n j } ∪ R(n j ), j = 2, ..., r, are replaced by 1 (the maximal valuation domain value); the sequence and the rounds are then referred to as reinforced penalization ones. After this, a strategic buyer will certainly either accept the price at the node n 1 , or reject the prices in all the nodes {n j } r j=1 even in the case of uncertainty about the future. Let δ l n := p(n) − inf m∈L(n) p(m) be the left increment [59, 27] of a node n ∈ T(A 1 ). In order to obtain upper bounds on strategic regret, it is important to have a tool that allows to locate the valuation of a strategic bidder. Such a tool can be obtained for div-transformed right-consistent RPPA algorithms with reinforced penalization rounds based on the following proposition, which is an analogue of [27, Prop.2] in our case with buyer uncertainty about the future. Proposition 1. Let γ m ∈ (0, 1), A 1 ∈ A RPPA ∩ C R be a RPPA right-consistent pricing algorithm, n ∈ T(A 1 ) be a starting node in a r-length penalization sequence (see Def. 1), r > log γm (1 − γ m ), sr : M×T(A 1 )
M → bool be a stopping rule, and the div-transformation div M ( A 1 , sr) be used by the seller for setting reserve prices. If, in a round, the node n is reached and the price p(n) is rejected by a strategic buyer m ∈ M (i.e., he bids lower than p(n)), then the following inequality on v m holds:
Proof sketch. The full proof is in App.A.1.2. Let t be the round in which the bidder m reaches the node n and rejects his reserve price p m t = p(n). In particular, it is the round where he is the noneliminated buyer and t = t m i ∈ T i for some period i. Since the buyers are divided and A 1 ∈ A RPPA , w.l.o.g., any strategy can be treated as a map to binary decisions {0, 1}
where we used the facts (i) that if the bidder accepts the price p(n), then he necessarily gets the good since all other bidders M −m are eliminated by a barrage price in this round t; and (ii) that the expected surplus in rounds s ≥ t + 1 is at least non-negative, because the subalgorithm
will be reinforced penalization ones (the strategic bidder will reject in all of them); and (ii) upper bounded the surplus in remaining rounds by assuming that only this bidder will get remaining goods for the lowest reserve price from the left subtree L(n). We unite these bounds on S m t (σ a ) and get
We emphasize that the dividing structure of the algorithm is crucially exploited in the proof of Prop. 1. Namely, the fact that all other bidders M −m are eliminated by a barrage price in the round t is used (a) to guarantee obtaining of the good at price p(n) by the buyer m and (b) to lower bound thus the future surplus S For a right-consistent algorithm A 1 ∈ C R , the increment δ l n is bounded by the difference between the current node's price p(n) and the last accepted price q by the buyer m before reaching this node. Hence, the Prop. 1 provides us with a tool to locate the valuation v m despite the strategic buyer does not myopically report its position (similar to [27, Prop.2] ). Namely, if the buyer m bids no lower than p(n), then v m ≥ p(n); if he bids lower than p(n), then q ≤ v < p(n)+ζ r,γm (p(n) − q) and the closer an offered price p(n) is to the last accepted price q the smaller the location interval of possible valuations v m (since its length is (1 + ζ r,γm )(p(n)−q)).
divPRRFES algorithm
In this section, we will show that we can use an optimal algorithm from the setting of repeated postedprice auctions to obtain the algorithm for our multi-bidder setting with upper bound on strategic regret with the same asymptotic. Namely, let us div-transform PRRFES [27] , further denoted as A 1 .
Since a div-transformation of PRRFES (with penalization reinforcement) individually tracks position of each buyer in the binary tree T( A 1 ), we adapt the key notations of PRRFES [27] to our case of multiple bidders and periods. Against a buyer m ∈ M, PRRFES A 1 works in phases initialized by the phase index l := 0, the last accepted price before the current phase q m 0 := 0, and the iteration parameter 0 := 1/2; at each phase l ∈ Z + , it sequentially offers prices p m -round 1-buyer game of the RPPA setting considered in [6, 27] , because the subhorizon I m and exact rounds I m (they determine the used discount factors: γ t−1 m , t ∈ I m ) are unknown in advance and depend on actions of the other bidders. Hence, this does not allow to straightforwardly utilize the result on the strategic regret for PRRFES proved in [27, Th.5] for the setting of RPPA. So, we have to prove the bound O(log log T ) for our case with buyer uncertainty about the future. Let us introduce the notation: r γ := log γ (1 − γ)/2 ∀γ ∈ (0, 1).
Lemma 2. Let γ 0 ∈ (0, 1), A 1 be the PRRFES algorithm with r ≥ r γ0 and the exploitation rate g(l) = 2 2 l , l ∈ Z + , and sr : M×T(A 1 )
M → bool be a stopping rule. Then, if I m ≥ 2, the individual regret of the div-transformed PRRFES div M ( A 1 , sr) against the buyer m ∈ M is upper bounded: 
, where the terms correspond to the accepted exploration rounds, the reject-penalization ones, and the exploitation ones. PRRFES and each rejected price p and needs not to be suspected in the period i and subsequent ones. For given parameters r and g(·) of the PRRFES algorithm A 1 , any state n ∈ T(A 1 ) of the algorithm can be mapped to the current phase l(n) and the last accepted price q(n) before the phase l(n). Thus, we define the stopping rule:
The div-transformation div M ( A 1 , sr A1 ) of the PRRFES algorithm A 1 with the stopping rule sr A1 defined in Eq. (5) is referred to as the dividing Penalized Reject-Revising Fast Exploiting Search (divPRRFES). The pseudo-code of divPRRFES is presented in Appendix B.2 of Supp.Materials. Lemma 3. Let γ 0 ∈ (0, 1), the discounts γ ∈ (0, γ 0 ] M , and the seller uses the divPRRFES pricing algorithm div M ( A 1 , sr A1 ) with the number of penalization rounds r ≥ r γ0 , with the exploitation rate g(l) = 2 2 l , l ∈ Z + , and with the stopping rule sr A1 defined in Eq. (5). Then, for a bidder m ∈ M with non-maximal valuation, i.e., v m < v, his subhorizon I m is bounded: ones. Thus, we showed that learning of the max-valuation bidders M converges with the rate inversely proportional to v − v (i.e., after the period (24 + 5r)/(v − v) the set of suspected bidders is always S i = M) and this learning contributes a constant (w.r.t. the horizon T ) to the strategic regret. Finally, Lemma 1, 2, and 3 trivially imply (see App. A.2.3) the following theorem. Theorem 1. Let γ 0 ∈ (0, 1), A 1 be the PRRFES algorithm with r ≥ r γ0 and the exploitation rate g(l) = 2 2 l , l ∈ Z + , and sr A1 be the stopping rule defined in Eq.(5). Then, for T≥2, the strategic regret of the divPRRFES pricing algorithm A = div M ( A 1 , sr A1 ) against the buyers M is upper bounded:
5 Discussion, extensions of the result, and conclusions
Other auction formats. The techniques and algorithms developed in our work can be applied in repeated auctions where another format of selling a good in a round is used. Namely, our results hold in our repeated setting with an auction format (within rounds) that satisfies the following: (a) personal reserve prices are allowed; and (b) if a buyer m is only one non-eliminated participant in a round t, then his bidding mechanism allows him to choose between getting the good for the reserve price p m t and rejecting it. This holds e.g. for first(/third/..)-price auctions, for PPA with multiple bidders, etc. Regret dependence on M . The upper bound of the divPRRFES regret in Eq. (7) linearly depends on M . We believe that it is not an artifact of our analysis tools, but a payment for the div-transformation. Consider the case in which all bidders have the same valuation, i.e., all their valuations are v. Each bidder will be always suspected by divPRRFES (i.e., be in S i ∀i). Hence, divPRRFES will just learn the valuation v for each of M bidders independently and, thus, M times slower; i.e., it is natural that the regret of divPRRFES is M times larger than the regret of PRRFES against a single buyer. However, there might exist an algorithm that do not suffer from dividing structure in this way. So, existence of an algorithm with a more favorable regret dependence on M is an open research question. Lower bound and optimality. For the case M = 1, there does exist the lower bound: the strategic regret of any pricing algorithm is Ω(log log T ) [59] . Hence, our upper bound for the algorithm divPRRFES is optimal in the general case of any number of bidders. Nonetheless, structure of the game with non-single buyer (M ≥ 2) is much more complicated, since a buyer has to act in the presence of rivals and under uncertainty about the future. This is an additional opportunity that can be exploited by a pricing algorithm. Thus, the validity of the lower bound Ω(log log T ) for M ≥ 2 is an open research question. Several other discussions of the results are also in App. D.
Conclusions
We studied the scenario of repeated second-price auctions with reserve pricing where a seller interacts with multiple strategic buyers. Each buyer participates in each round of the game, holds a fixed private valuation for a good, and seeks to maximize his expected future discounted surplus. First, we proposed the so-called dividing transformation that upgrades an algorithm designed for the setup with a single buyer to the multi-buyer case. Second, the transformation allowed us to obtain a novel horizon-independent algorithm that can be applied against strategic buyers with regret upper bound of O(log log T ). Finally, we introduced non-trivial techniques such as (a) the method to locate the valuation of a strategic buyer in a played round under buyer uncertainty about the future; (b) the decomposition of strategic regret into the individual and deviation parts; and (c) the approach to learn the highest-valuation bidder with deviation regret of O(1).
So, formally, we have
where the two first identities follow from definitions, while the latter one is just a change of the order of summation (since {1 
Let us bound each side of this inequality:
where, in the second identity, we used the fact that if the bidder accepts the price p(n), then he necessarily gets the good since all other bidders M −m are eliminated by a barrage price in this round t (it is the key point of the proof!). In the last inequality, we used that the expected surplus in rounds s ≥ t + 1 is at least non-negative, because the subalgorithm A1 ∈ C R is right consistent and accepting of the offered price p(m) in some reached node m ∈ T(A1) s.t. p(m) > v m will thus result in reserve prices for him higher than his valuation v m in all subsequent rounds as well (so, the buyer has no incentive to get a local negative surplus in a round, because it will result in non-positive surplus in all subsequent rounds).
where i is the current period of the div-algorithm divM ( A1 , sr), i.e., the round t = t m i ∈ Ti is such that the buyer m is the non-eliminated participant in this round (see Sec.3). In the second identity, we used the fact that if the bidder rejects the price p (in which the bidder will be non-eliminated) will be reinforced penalization rounds (and the strategic bidder will reject prices in all of them as well). In the first inequality, we just upper bounded surplus by assuming that only this bidder left among the suspected bidders Sj, j > i, and he receives the lowest possible reserve price from the left subtree L(n) of the node n. The latter inequality is just a simple arithmetic upper bound for the sum of discounts 
where the first, second, and third terms correspond to the exploration rounds with acceptance, the rejectpenalization rounds, and the exploitation rounds 7 , respectively. Since the basis of the subalgorithm PRRFES A1 ∈ C R is right-consistent [27] , as discussed in the proof of Proposition 1 (see Appendix A.1.2), the optimal strategy of the bidder m is non-losing [27] : the buyer has no incentive to get a local negative surplus in a round, because it will result in non-positive surplus in all subsequent rounds. 
, because any accepted price has to be lower than the valuation v m for the strategic buyer (whose optimal strategy is locally non-losing one, as we stated above). This infers K m l+1 < 2 l / l+1 = 2N l+1 , where 7 Note that the prices at the exploitation rounds p m l,K m l are equal to either 0 or an earlier accepted price, and are thus accepted by the strategic buyer (since the buyer's decisions at these rounds do not affect further pricing of the algorithm divPRRFES).
. Therefore, for the phases l = 1, . . . , L m , we have:
where we used the definitions of N l and l . For the zeroth phase l = 0, one has trivial bound
Hence, by definition of the exploitation rate g(l), we have g(l) = −1 l and, thus,
Moreover, this inequality holds for the L m -th phase, since it differs from the other ones only in possible absence of some rounds (reject-penalization or exploitation ones). Namely, for the L m -th phase, we have:
where rLm is the actual number of reject-penalization rounds and gLm (L m ) is the actual number of exploitation ones in the last phase. Since rLm ≤ r and gLm 
Thus, one needs only to estimate the number of phases L m by the subhorizon
, For instance, (a) the penalization parameter r can be made adaptive to take into account the rounds in which a buyer is eliminated (i.e., reduce the number of penalizations by the number of rivals currently suspected by the seller); (b) or the stopping rule srA 1 can faster eliminate bidders, since the lower bound u m i can be updated each time the buyer m accepts an exploration price p m l,k . Despite these improvements would require some additional pages in our proofs, they do not improve the asymptotic bound of O(log log T ).
Notation Expression Description
Horizon independence. The algorithm divPRRFES is horizon-independent since it is based on the horizonindependent PRRFES A1, which induces the subalgorithm A1 and the stopping rule srA 1 . Hence, the seller is not required to know in advance the number of rounds T of the game, when she applies divPRRFES.
